The Surge Is Working

AP reports Iraq residents rise up against al-Qaida, asking U.S. forces for help in a battle that ended up neeting 45 Al Qaeda terrorists killed or captured. Bill Roggio notes progress against Mahdi Army and continuing "Awakening" movements where the Sunnis are peeling away from Al Qaeda insurgency:

"A significant portion of the 1920 Revolution Brigades, in addition to elements of the Islamic Army in Iraq, have turned on AQI in Anbar and other provinces. The two insurgent groups have given substantial support to the Awakening movements spreading throughout Iraq."

An FR commentator notes: The surge is working. More Al QAEDA and Sadr-Madhi Army leaders have been killed or captured in the past two months that were in the previous year.

The main skepticism on the surge is from the media and 'chattering classes'. Will our forces be given the means and the time necessary to win? Our main battlefront there is in DC, not Baghdad.

UPDATE: Major Gerd Schroeder on "Why the Surge Is Working, Yet More Americans are Dying":

The most important factor that has contributed the fledgling success of the surge, and simultaneously to the significant increase in American deaths, is that the Americans began to move into Combat Outposts (COPs) or Joint Security Stations (JSS) starting in February 2007 (BIII, Page 8). The number of JSSs alone has steadily increased from 10 JSSs in February 2007 to 65 as of 23 May, and more will be established in the coming months. In short, our troops have moved and continue to move permanently into the neighborhoods in which they are work. They have increased their visibility, activity, and interaction with the population, while concurrently increasing their contact with the bad guys.

More interaction means a more effective operation but with greater casualties. The difference is that sectarian violence is down, the coordination and collaboration with Iraqis is up, and the the Al Qaeda terrorists are increasingly under pressure, with more enemy killed and captured than ever before.